ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: MARIETTA LINES--CROSSING THE CHATTAHOOCHEE

Continuous rains in June--Allatoona made a field depot on the
railway and fortified--Johnston in the Marietta lines--That from
Pine Mountain to Lost Mountain abandoned--Swinging our right
flank--Affair at Kolb's farm--Preparing for a general attack--Battle
of Kennesaw--The tactical problem--Work of my division--Topography
about Cheney's--Our advance on the 27th--Nickajack valley
reached--The army moves behind us--Johnston retreats to the
Chattahoochee--Twenty-third Corps at Smyrna Camp-ground--Crossing
the Chattahoochee at Soap Creek--At Roswell--Johnston again
retreats--Correspondence with Davis--Mission of B. H. Hill--Visit of
Bragg to Johnston--Johnston's unfortunate reticence--He is relieved
and Hood placed in command--Significance of the change to the
Confederacy and to us.

In the month of June we had more than three weeks of pouring rains,
making a quagmire of the whole country. The "dirt roads," which were
the only ones, were soon destroyed by the heavy army wagons, and
even the place where they had been could not be distinguished in the
waste of mud and ruts which spread far and wide. Sherman found the
intrenchments Johnston had left "an immense line of works," and
congratulated himself that they had been turned with less loss to
himself than he had inflicted on the enemy. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 408.] The first reconnoissances
found that Johnston had retreated so far that, from the commander
downward, we all harbored the hope that he had retreated beyond the
Chattahoochee. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 427.] To prepare for our next
step, the railway crossing of the Etowah must be completed and our
depot of supplies advanced to Allatoona. The gorge there was almost
as defensible on the south as on the north, and Sherman set Captain
Poe, his engineer, to work laying out fortifications to cover its
southern mouth and thus prepare for holding it by a small garrison
as a secondary base if we should have to leave it again to make a
wide turning movement. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 428.]

[Illustration: Vicinity of Marietta, June 20,--July 4, 1864.]

We were not long in learning that Johnston was not over the
Chattahoochee, but had only fallen back to a shorter and more
formidable line about Marietta, covering the railway where it passed
through the defiles of Kennesaw Mountain, extending his left centre
to the isolated knob of Pine Mountain, and thence recurving his
flank by way of Gilgal (Hard-Shell Church in local nomenclature)
toward Lost Mountain, which was held by his cavalry.

At the first appearance of a retreat by the Confederates beyond the
Chattahoochee, Sherman's mind naturally turned to the plans of
campaign which should follow his approach to Atlanta as they had
been indicated by General Grant at the beginning of operations in
the spring, and he inquired of Halleck whether the intended movement
of the fleet under Farragut and part of the southwestern army under
Canby against Mobile had been ordered. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 418.] Halleck answered that it had been
suggested to Canby, but that Grant had, just then, all he could
attend to on the Chickahominy. The fierce battles in Virginia had
culminated on June 3d, in the terrible struggle at Cold Harbor,
where the assault had been so costly as almost to produce dismay
throughout the country, and in all our armies to enforce the lesson
of caution in attacking such works as the enemy was now habitually
constructing. The feeling was hinted at by Sherman in his dispatch
to Washington on the 5th, when he said that although he should
probably have to fight Johnston at Kennesaw, he would not "run head
on to his fortifications." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 408.]

Amid the discouragements incident to the incessant rains the army
gained positions closely enveloping Johnston's lines, and we who
constituted the right flank, pushing out from hill to hill and from
brook to brook, gradually outflanked the enemy and forced him to
swing back his left. On the 14th he let go of Pine Mountain, where
General Polk was killed and General Johnston himself had a narrow
escape from our artillery fire while they were reconnoitring our
positions from its summit. On the 16th we were close upon the Gilgal
and Lost Mountain line, and the enemy again withdrew that flank
beyond Mud Creek, which with Noyes's Creek [Footnote: Noyes's Creek
was pronounced Noses Creek by the negroes and the people of the
neighborhood, and the name took that form in our reports at the
time. It was afterward corrected in the Official Records.] and
Olley's are the tributaries of the Sweetwater (before mentioned)
which flows southward into the Chattahoochee. Sherman was on the
lookout for weak places in his adversary's line where he might break
through and change into a rout the war of positions which was too
much like siege operations to suit him. He said to Halleck that
Johnston had declined the assault which must have followed our so
close contact, "and abandoned Lost Mountain and some six miles of as
good field-works as I ever saw." [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 498.] Still keeping the right shoulder forward,
we crowded in upon the new line, and in the night of the 18th the
enemy retreated from the intrenchments behind Mud Creek to those of
Noyes's Creek, whilst at the same time he drew back his extreme
right behind Noonday Creek, compacting his lines with the purpose of
transferring a corps to his left, where we now began to threaten his
communications.

Again there was a momentary belief that Marietta was abandoned, but
again it was premature, for the apex of the angle was stoutly held
at the rocky crest of Kennesaw. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 519.] There was
nothing for it but to continue the swing of the right flank. In his
instructions to Thomas, Sherman said, "Until Schofield develops the
flank we should move with due caution; but the moment it is found or
we are satisfied the enemy has lengthened his line beyond his
ability to defend, we must strike quick and with great energy."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 509.]

The waters were up in all the streams, and Noyes's was wholly
unfordable. Following the Sandtown road southward, my division was
stopped by the creek, and the enemy's artillery and dismounted
cavalry held a good position on the other side, having removed the
flooring of the bridge. In a brilliant little affair by a part of
Cameron's brigade, the bridge was carried, and the whole division
was soon across and intrenched at the crest on the south side,
covering the intersection of the Sandtown road with that from
Marietta to Powder Springs Church. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviiii. pt. iv. pp. 534, 540.] On the morning of June 22d, the
rest of Schofield's corps crossed the creek and took the Marietta
road, whilst Hooker's corps swung forward from the right of the
Cumberland Army to keep pace with Schofield. My own division at the
same time marched southward on the Sandtown road to Cheney's farm,
near the crossing of Olley's Creek, the next in the series of
parallel valleys trending to the southwest. Cheney's was also at the
crossing of the lower road from Marietta to Powder Springs village,
which forked near Kolb's farm, the northern branch being that on
which Schofield was advancing with Hascall's division. But Hood's
corps was also upon this road, having marched in the night from the
extreme right of Johnston's army to extend the left and meet our
aggressive movement. This brought on the bloody affair of Kolb's (or
Culp's) farm, Hood making a fierce attack on Schofield's left and
Hooker's right, which was repulsed. [Footnote: Atlanta, p. 108,
etc.] The enemy had to content himself with extending southward the
line confronting ours, till it passed over the ridge behind Noyes's
creek and covered the valley of Olley's. Schofield had called me
with three brigades to Hascall's support, leaving one (Reilly's) at
the Cheney farm. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 558, 559, 566-569.]

Hood's attack had checked the flanking movement from which Sherman
had hoped good results. Johnston had also been able to stretch out
his right so that the works in front of McPherson seemed to be held
in force enough to make an assault unpromising. On the reports of
subordinates as to their uneasiness at the stretching of their
lines, Thomas suggested to Sherman that the lines be contracted and
strengthened. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 581.] At the same time reports
were received that Confederate cavalry had crossed the Etowah in our
rear, and had begun to make use of torpedoes to derail and destroy
trains on the railway. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 579.] Yet Garrard's cavalry on our left reported the
enemy's horse superior in numbers, and were unable to make such
progress there as Sherman had expected. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 542,
555.] It began to look like a dead-lock, and that, of all things,
was what Sherman could not endure. With grim humor he wrote to
Thomas, "I suppose the enemy with his smaller force intends to
surround us!" [Footnote: _Id_., p. 582.] The only alternative seemed
to be to find the places where that smaller force was most
attenuated and break through by main strength. He notified his
subordinates that this must be done on the 27th. [Footnote: _Ibid_.
and p. 588.] As a preliminary, he ordered demonstrations to be kept
up on both flanks to draw the enemy away from the centre. His formal
order, issued on the 24th, directed General Thomas to select a point
of attack near his centre. McPherson was directed to make a feint
with his cavalry and one division of infantry on the left, but to
make his real attack at a point south and west of Kennesaw.
Schofield was likewise to make a demonstration on the extreme right,
in front of my division, but to attack a point as near as
practicable to the Powder Springs road, which was the scene of the
affair of the 22d. [Footnote: _Ibid_.] The tactical details were all
left to the subordinate army commanders.

On the 25th Sherman visited our positions in person, and accompanied
the active reconnoissances which we were making. The result he
stated in an evening dispatch to Thomas, saying, "I found that the
enemy had strengthened his works across the Powder Springs road very
much, having made embrasures for three complete batteries, all
bearing on that road. Line extends as far as can be seen to the
right, mostly in timber and partly in open ground. The enemy is also
on his [Schofield's] right flank on the other side of Olley's
Creek." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 589.]
The outcome of this was a modification of Schofield's orders, so
that instead of attacking seriously in force, he should make strong
demonstrations to attract the enemy to our wing of the army as much
as possible, and thus assist Thomas and McPherson in their attacks
near the centre.

It was with reluctance that Sherman was brought to the determination
to make a front assault. His preference and his earlier purpose had
been to make an equal force to Johnston's keep the Confederates in
their works whilst the remainder of his own army should move from
our right and attack beyond Johnston's left flank. He had thought
the opportunity was come when we had secured the crossing of Noyes's
Creek, and he indicated the morning of the 22d for an advance on the
Powder Springs and Marietta road which we then commanded. In his
dispatch to Thomas on the 21st, he said, "I feel much disposed to
push your right, supported by Schofield and Stoneman's cavalry,
whilst McPherson engages attention to his front, but keeps ready to
march by his right to reinforce you." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 546.]

The founderous condition of the whole region had made every movement
slow, and in the same note to Thomas, Sherman had summed it up in
the two words: "Roads terrific." Yet on the morning of the 22d the
way to Marietta by the Powder Springs road was only contested by
cavalry, though Johnston's ever-watchful eye had seen the danger and
by his order Hood was marching his corps from the other flank of the
army to meet Sherman's extension by our right. In going to examine
McPherson's lines himself, Sherman had added to his dispatch, "If
anything happens, act promptly with your own troops and advise me
and your neighbor, Schofield, who has standing orders to conform to
you." [Footnote: _Ibid_.] The situation was, in fact, exactly what
he had been hoping for. The flank of the enemy was exposed, and we
had the opportunity to use the broad road leading to Marietta to
turn it. Could Hooker, supported by Hascall's division of our corps,
have reached Zion's Church before Hood, or at the same time with
him, it seems almost certain that the position gained would have
compelled Johnston to abandon Kennesaw and Marietta at once, and
fall back to the line of the Nickajack if not beyond the
Chattahoochee. In that case the battle of Kennesaw would not have
been fought.

In the evening of the 22d, when Sherman received Hooker's answer to
a question sent him during the progress of the combat in the
afternoon, and found the latter laboring under the conviction that
the whole of Johnston's army was in his immediate front, he was
naturally annoyed at so exaggerated a view of the situation.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 558.] Thomas
received similar reports from Hooker and a call for reinforcements,
and though he said he "thought at the time he was stampeded,"
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 559.] he sent to him a division from Howard's
corps. The truth was that one brigade of Hooker's corps and one of
Schofield's were the only ones that had suffered at all severely,
the total list of less than 300 casualties being about equally
divided between them. Hood had been repulsed with a loss of more
than 1000. [Footnote: Atlanta, p. 113.] When to these circumstances
are added those which have before been mentioned, [Footnote: _Ante_,
pp. 258, 259.] we can understand how Sherman began to fear that, in
the systematic flanking operations he had been carrying on, his army
was losing the energetic aggressive character without which he could
not profit decisively by the opportunities which might offer.
[Footnote: See Sherman's personal letters to Halleck of July 9th,
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 91; to Grant of June 18th,
_Id_., pt. iv. p. 507; and of July 12th, _Id_., pt. v. p. 123.]
Adding still further the difficulty, amounting almost to an
impossibility, of supplying the wing of the army most distant from
the railroad, and the probability that Johnston's army was stretched
into a line even thinner than his own, it will not seem strange that
he concluded it was time to try whether a bold stroke would not
break through the Confederate defences and rout his adversary. I am
saying this from the standpoint of our own experience in the wooded
and sparsely settled region we were operating in. From a European
point of view, an aggressive policy of attack would be taken as a
matter of course, and the only questions open for debate would be
the tactical ones as to the method of making the assault and the
points at which to deliver it. [Footnote: For a recent summary of
the discussion of "Attack or Defence," see Letters and Essays of
Captain F. N. Maude, R. E. (International Series), p. 70; also his
"Cavalry and Infantry" (same series), p. 127, etc.]

The attack was made on the 27th, and failed to carry the enemy's
works, though our troops were able to hold positions close to the
ditch and to intrench themselves on a new line there. The casualties
in the action were 2164. [Footnote: In Logan's Corps, 629 (Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iii. p. 85); in Howard's, 756 (_Id_., pt.
i. p. 205), and in Palmer's, 779 (_Id_., p. 509).] Some of the best
officers who took part in the assault were of the opinion that had
the supports been well in hand, so as to have charged quickly over
the first line when it was checked and lost its impetus, the works
in front of Davis's division would have been carried. [Footnote:
McCook's Brigade at Kennesaw Mountain, by Major F. B. James of the
Fifty-Second Ohio; Ohio Loyal Legion Papers, vol. iv. pp. 269, 270.]
It is hardly necessary to say that at the present day an entirely
different deployment and organization of the attacking forces would
be considered essential, and the preparation by concentrated
artillery fire would be much more thorough than was practicable
then. The dense forest made the cannonade almost harmless at the
points chosen for assault, and the attack was one of infantry
against unshaken earthworks. [Footnote: For description of the
battle, see "Atlanta," chap. x.]

In Sherman's visit to our position on the 25th, he had arranged with
Schofield the general plan for our demonstrations on the 26th and
27th. Hascall's division was to make a feint of attack near the
Powder Springs road, whilst mine should force the crossing of
Olley's Creek near Cheney's, on the Sandtown road, build a temporary
bridge over the creek a mile or two above, and make a strong show of
a purpose to attack beyond Hascall's right flank by crossing with a
brigade there. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 589, 592.]

The valley of Olley's Creek was broad and open, and the country
beyond my right was more practicable than the tangled wilderness on
the northern slope of the watershed. We had got beyond the denser
thickets of the loblolly pine, and could better see what we were
about. The old Sandtown road south of Cheney's crossed the creek on
a wooden bridge which was commanded by a fortified hill a little
beyond where a battery of artillery swept the bridge and its
approaches. The stream widened out after passing the bridge and ran
between low and marshy banks with bluffs further back. I had placed
Reilly's brigade astride the road at Cheney's with Myer's Indiana
battery of light twelves, smooth-bore bronze guns. A gap of more
than a mile lay between Reilly and the other three brigades of the
division after I had marched to Hascall's support on the 22d. The
lower branch of the Powder Springs road was parallel to the creek
and not far from it, and my artillery near the right of the three
brigades was on an advancing knoll where the guns not only commanded
the valley before them, but Cockerill's Ohio battery of three-inch
rifles swept nearly the whole space to Reilly's position. [Footnote:
_Id._, p. 568.]

To give more effect to our demonstration, Sherman directed that it
begin on the 26th, and preparations were made to build a bridge in
front of Byrd's brigade, which was ordered to cross the stream when
Reilly's effort against the lower bridge should begin. Our first
information was that the fortified hill in front of Reilly was held
by infantry, and as the work was in form a redoubt, its garrison of
course on foot, we assumed that it was a detached outwork of the
Confederate line. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
p. 597.] Reilly kept up a cannonade of the hill in front of him
during the 26th, and made some attempts to get over the stream at
the bridge, but did not seriously try to force the passage. A
temporary bridge was laid at Byrd's position, and soon after noon he
crossed the creek with little opposition, our artillery thoroughly
commanding the further bank. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 599] I personally
accompanied Byrd's movement. The artillery of Hascall's division as
well as my own was turned on the enemy's works when they came out
into the open. The hills along this part of Olley's Creek were not a
continuous ridge, but knobby and somewhat detached; the higher land
marking the edge of the plateau about Marietta was further back, and
the Confederate line of works followed it. Byrd's direction of march
was nearly parallel to the Sandtown road, and by advancing about a
mile and a half he reached the summit of a rough wooded hill about
six hundred yards from the main ridge, with open ground intervening.
He was here from half a mile to a mile east of the Sandtown road,
and from the fortified hill in front of Reilly, which was on the
continuation of the same ridge, though with ravines interrupting it.
The position was a very threatening one, and if any demonstration
could draw the enemy in that direction, this seemed likely to do it.
I directed Byrd to intrench on the crest, drawing back the flanks of
the brigade so as to be ready for attack from any direction. Our
movement had been sharply resisted by the enemy, but so far as we
could see, only by dismounted cavalry. Sherman had said that he did
not care to have Reilly force the passage of the creek that
afternoon, for a strong threatening of the fortified hill would be
more likely to draw the enemy that way than actually capturing it.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 597.] On my
reporting to General Schofield in the evening the position of Byrd's
brigade with the favorable look of the country beyond, it was
arranged that Byrd's bridge should be made stronger for permanent
use, and that Cameron's brigade should follow him at daylight in the
morning. With my whole division except Barter's brigade, which was
left to cover Hascall's right flank, I was to test what further
progress could be made on the Sandtown road. [Footnote: _Id._, pp.
598-600.]

At peep of day on the 27th we were astir, anxious to get our part of
the day's work well advanced before the more serious engagement at
the centre should begin. Another battery had been sent to Reilly,
and he was directed to silence the enemy's guns and find a way
across the creek under cover of his own if he could, but if this
failed, to storm the bridge.

Cameron was over Byrd's bridge at four o'clock, and was ordered upon
reaching the ridge in rear of Byrd to push boldly along it toward
the fortified hill the other side of the Sandtown road in front of
Reilly. Byrd's orders were to hold his position with the main body
of his brigade, but to throw out detachments and skirmishers in all
directions to watch the enemy and to get information of the country.
Leaving Cameron as soon as he was well on his way, I rode to Reilly
in front of the Cheney farm, and found that at five his dispositions
for forcing the passage of the stream were well under way. He had
determined to try it some distance below the bridge, at a place
where, though the banks were swampy, the creek was fordable, and the
hills behind gave good opportunity to use the artillery and put the
men across under shelter. My chief of artillery, Major Wells, was
with him, selecting places for the batteries and getting them in
position. Soon after six I was with Cameron again, and before eight
was back at Reilly's position, urging each to all the speed which
the strong skirmishing opposition would permit. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 619.] As it was necessary to pass
from one position to the other by way of the roads at the rear, it
made hard riding for one who wished to be as much as possible with
the active heads of columns.

Soon after eight o'clock part of Reilly's brigade got over the swamp
and creek under cover of the artillery, uncovering the bridge at the
road where the rest crossed; Cameron's was now coming into close
co-operation from the east, and a dashing charge by both carried the
hill. [Footnote: _Id._, pt. ii. pp. 683, 703, 720.] It was now
half-past eight, and the cannonade which preceded the attacks at the
centre was opening heavily behind us. [Footnote: _Id._, pt. i. pp.
199, 632.] The captured position was a commanding one, and the view
from it covered the whole region from Kennesaw to Lost Mountain.
Cameron was left there whilst Reilly followed the retreating enemy
with orders to advance as far as he could toward the Marietta and
Sandtown road, which was supposed to come into the old Cassville and
Sandtown road a mile or two ahead. We now knew from prisoners that
the force opposed to us was the division of Confederate cavalry
under Jackson, and that they were not closely supported by infantry.

The hill had been held by Ross's brigade, which retreated to another
eminence half a mile further down the road. Reilly again advanced,
supported by Cameron. Ross was again dislodged and retreated upon
the rest of the division at the junction of the roads above
mentioned. [Footnote: _Id._, pt. iv. pp. 799-801.] As we advanced it
became evident that the principal ridge on which Johnston's army was
broke down into separate hills as it came forward toward the forks
of the main roads, and it seemed feasible to hold some of these in
such a way as to make mutually supporting positions from Byrd to
Reilly, covering a front of two miles and commanding the lower part
of the Nickajack valley, in which the Marietta road ran. Reilly was
put in one of these positions with his right across the road on
which we had come, two miles south of Cheney's; Cameron was ordered
forward upon high ground near Reilly's left, and Byrd was directed
to straighten out his line on his right and reach as far as he could
toward Cameron. All were ordered to intrench as rapidly and
thoroughly as possible, for it was plain that we now commanded a
short road to the railway in Johnston's rear, and that he must drive
us out or abandon the Kennesaw line he had clung to so stubbornly.

I had sent my aide, Mr. Coughlan, with the orders to Byrd, and when
the line was extended and skirmishers partly covered the front, he
came back to me by a direct course from Byrd to Cameron and Reilly,
with the daring and intelligence which made him a model staff
officer, and reported that a continuous ridge connected the brigades
so that pickets could be well placed in the interval to give warning
of any hostile attempt to pass between. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 620, 621. Lieutenant Coughlan was
afterward killed in the heroic performance of duty at the battle of
Franklin. See "Franklin," p. 114.] A small hill a few hundred yards
in front of the main line better commanded the Marietta road, and
upon this I directed Reilly to build a lunette for an advanced guard
of a regiment and a battery.

The whole affair was one of the minor class in war, but it had a
special interest, in our ignorance of the topography of the country,
because it revealed a way to Johnston's line of communications,
which could not be seen and was not suspected when Sherman made the
reconnoissance with us on the 25th, and saw the Confederate lines
crossing the Powder Springs road and stretching away far beyond our
right. In my field dispatch to General Schofield I said: "The
possession of the end of the ridge, if we can hold it, I am now sure
will prevent the enemy from extending his line along it, since it
would be necessarily flanked and enfiladed by our positions. The
only objection is the extension relatively to the strength of my
command and the distance from supports. Upon carefully re-examining
the ground my conviction is strengthened that it is exceedingly
desirable to hold all we have gained, and if Hascall's place could
possibly be filled by troops drawn from other parts of the line, it
would give all the force needed to make a _point-d'appui_ which
would be safe and exceedingly available for future movements in this
direction if they become necessary. I only suggest this by way of
indicating the impression made on my own mind by the position."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 621.]

Reilly was three miles distant from Barter's brigade, which covered
the right of the continuous line of the army intrenchments, and it
was certainly risking something to extend the brigades of a single
division so far, but it would have been a great disappointment to us
to have been called back. General Schofield instantly saw the
advantage, and in answering my dispatch, said, "I do not think the
importance of the position you have gained can be over-estimated,
especially in view of the failure elsewhere and probable future
movements." [Footnote: _Ibid_. See map, p. 255.] He ordered
Stoneman's cavalry to aid me in holding the ground and in picketing
the intervals, and reported to General Sherman the details of the
operation. The latter determined to make use of the advantage
gained, and said, "If we had our supplies well up, I would move at
once by the right flank, but I suppose we must cover our railroad a
few days." [Footnote: Dispatch to McPherson, _Id._, p. 622.] We were
left, therefore, for a little while in our exposed position, whilst
the whole army made strenuous efforts to get forward supplies enough
for a few days' separation from the railway. The weather had begun
to favor us. The day of the affair at the Kolb farm (22d) had been
the first fair day of the month, and the continuous clear skies and
hot suns rapidly dried the roads. Sherman sent Captain Poe to make
an engineer's examination of our position and reconnoissance in
front. The report confirmed his purpose of making us the pivot in a
swinging movement of the whole army. On the 29th Generals Thomas and
Howard accompanied General Schofield and myself in a similar
inspection, to help fix the details of the movement for the Army of
the Cumberland. Crittenden's brigade of dismounted cavalry reported
to me for temporary duty as infantry with my division. On the 1st of
July Hascall's division was relieved by the extension of Hooker's
corps, and Schofield with his whole corps in hand advanced a mile
upon the Marietta road toward Ruff's Mill. Johnston's failure to
attack was proof that he was preparing for retreat, and Sherman
pressed the movement of his own army.

On the 2d Johnston knew that McPherson's army was marching to
interpose between him and the Chattahoochee, and issued his orders
for the evacuation of the Marietta lines in the night, and the
occupation of the position beyond the Nickajack. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 860.] But Thomas and McPherson both
followed so vigorously that the Confederate general saw that he
could not cover the crossings of the river which Stoneman's cavalry
was already reaching on our right, and in the night of the 4th he
again retired, this time to intrenchments with both flanks resting
on the river and covering the railway bridge with two or three of
the principal ferries. With his usual prudence, Johnston had
prepared both these lines with the aid of the Georgia militia under
General Gustavus W. Smith, who, being himself an engineer, was
admirably fitted to co-operate with the plans of the staff.

Again a few days had to be given to repairs of the railroad and a
readjustment of the depots and means of supply, whilst careful
reconnoissances of the river were made both above and below the
Confederate position. Schofield's corps was placed in reserve near
the railway, at Smyrna Camp ground, and on the 8th my division was
assigned the duty of making a crossing of the Chattahoochee, and
laying pontoon bridges at Isham's ford and ferry at the mouth of
Soap Creek, [Footnote: In the official Atlas, pl. lx., two creeks
are named Rottenwood. The upper one of these with paper-mills upon
it is Soap Creek. The ford was sometimes called Cavalry Ford in the
Confederate dispatches. For particulars of the movements at this
period of the campaign, see "Atlanta," chap. xi.] about nine miles
above the railway crossing of the river. Johnston does not seem to
have been well served by his cavalry on this occasion, for the
crossing was gained and two bridges laid with only trifling
opposition, and my division was over and strongly intrenched before
any concentration of the enemy was made in my front. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. pp. 85, 89, 93.] This, of
course, decided Johnston to abandon the northern bank of the river,
and he selected a strong position behind Peach-tree Creek as the
next line of defence for Atlanta, burning the railway bridge and
other bridges behind him.

Several days were occupied by Sherman in moving McPherson's command
to Roswell, twenty miles above the railway, and building a
trestle-bridge there, in accumulating supplies and organizing
transportation for another considerable absence from the railroad.
By the 17th the army was over the Chattahoochee, McPherson on the
left, Schoneld next, and Thomas from the centre to the right. A
general wheel of the whole toward the right was ordered, to find and
drive back the enemy upon Atlanta.

Meanwhile the relations between General Johnston and the Confederate
government had reached a crisis. He had regularly reported the
actual movements of his army, but had carefully avoided any
indication of his intentions or of his hopes or fears. When, on the
5th of July, he retreated to the position at the Chattahoochee
crossing, his dispatch briefly announced that "In consequence of the
enemy's advance toward the river below our left, we this morning
took this position, which is slightly intrenched." [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 865.] Mr. Davis replied on
the 7th, expressing grave apprehensions at the situation, pointing
out the dangers of the position, and saying that other places had
been stripped to reinforce him, that further increase was
impossible, and that they now depended on his success. [Footnote:
_Id_., p. 867.] By an unfortunate blunder of a subordinate, the
dispatch was not sent in cipher as was intended, and Johnston knew
that the contents with its implied criticism was known to the
telegraphers along the line and was practically public property.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 871] this was not soothing to the general's
feelings, even when explained. His answer said that he had been
forced back by siege operations, and had no opportunity for battle
except by attacking intrenchments. He suggested that the enemy's
purpose to capture Atlanta might be foiled by sending part of the
16,000 cavalry believed to be in Alabama and Mississippi to break up
the railroads behind Sherman and force him to retreat. Davis replied
with the intimation that Johnston must know that no such force was
available in the West, and that it would be much more to the purpose
to use the cavalry he had for that task of pressing importance.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 875] He sent also by letter fuller details of
the stress under which General S.D. Lee was in the Department of
Mississippi, showing that the hands of that officer were more than
full. [Footnote: The letter, however, did not reach Johnston till
after he had been relieved of command.] On the 10th Johnston had
forwarded a laconic dispatch, saying, "On the night of the 8th the
enemy crossed at Isham's Cavalry Ford; intrenched. In consequence we
crossed at and below the railroad, and are now about two miles from
the river, guarding the crossings." [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 873.] On the 11th he telegraphed,
recommending the immediate distribution elsewhere of the prisoners
at Andersonville. [Footnote: _Id_., p.876]

It cannot be denied that there was a certain justification for Mr.
Davis's conclusion that the circumstances foreboded the yielding of
Atlanta without the desperate struggle which the importance of the
position demanded. Had Johnston expressed any hopefulness, or said,
what was the fact, that he was himself coming to the determnation to
try the effect of a bold attack whilst Sherman's army was in motion,
he would probably have been left in command. But the personal
estrangement had gone so far that he confined himself rigidly to the
briefest report of events, leaving the Richmond government to guess
what was next to happen. His attitude was in effect a challenge to
the Confederate President to trust the Confederate cause in Georgia
to him absolutely, or to take the responsibility of removing him.
The Hon. B. H. Hill, who was in Richmond, at Johnston's request, to
learn if it was possible to reinforce him, telegraphed him on the
14th, "You must do the work with your present force. For God's sake,
do it." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 879.] Governor Brown offered to furnish
5000 "old men and boys" for the local defence of Atlanta in the
emergency, in addition to the similar number of the militia reserves
already in the field. These were 'promptly accepted by Mr. Davis and
the order was issued to arm them. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 878, and vol.
lii. pt. ii. pp. 691-695, 704. The correspondence between Mr. Hill
and Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War, is especially instructive as to
the issue between Johnston and Davis.]

Before acting further the Confederate President sent out General
Bragg to Atlanta to examine on the spot and report upon the
condition of affairs. Bragg arrived on the 13th and reported that an
entire evacuation of Atlanta seemed to be indicated by what he saw.
The army was sadly depleted, he said, and reported 10,000 less than
the return of June 10th. He could find but little encouraging.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 878.] On the
following two days he visited Johnston twice and was "received
courteously and kindly." "He has not sought my advice," Bragg added,
"and it was not volunteered. I cannot learn that he has any more
plan for the future than he has had in the past. It is expected that
he will await the enemy on a line some three miles from here, and
the impression prevails that he is now more inclined to fight. The
enemy is very cautious, and intrenches immediately on taking a new
position. His force, like our own, is greatly reduced by the hard
campaign. His infantry now very little over 60,000. The morale of
our army is still reported good." [Footnote: _Id._, p. 881.]

The receipt of this dispatch with Johnston's of the 16th seems to
have decided President Davis to make a change in the command of the
army, and on the 17th Hood was appointed to the temporary rank of
general in the Provisional Army and ordered to relieve Johnston.
[Footnote: _Id._, pp. 885, 887, 889.] Hood shrank from the
responsibility in the crisis which then existed, and suggested delay
till the fate of Atlanta should be decided; but Mr. Davis replied,
"A change of commanders, under existing circumstances, was regarded
as so objectionable that I only accepted it as the alternative of
continuing in a policy which had proved so disastrous. Reluctance to
make the change induced me to send a telegram of inquiry to the
commanding general on the 16th instant. His reply but confirmed
previous apprehensions. There can be but one question which you and
I can entertain: that is, what will best promote the public good;
and to each of you I confidently look for the sacrifice of every
personal consideration in conflict with that object." [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 888.]

Johnston magnanimously assisted Hood in completing the movements of
the army during the 18th to the Peachtree Creek position and
explained to him his plans. These were, first, to attack Sherman's
army when divided in crossing that difficult stream, and, if
successful, to press the advantage to decisive results. If
unsuccessful, to hold the Peachtree lines till Governor Brown's
militia were assembled;[Footnote: Johnston says ten thousand of
these were promised him instead of five. Narrative, p. 348.] then,
holding Atlanta with these, to draw the army back through the town
and march out with the three corps against one of Sherman's flanks,
with the confidence that even if his attack did not succeed, with
Atlanta so strongly fortified he could hold it forever. [Footnote:
Narrative, p. 350.]

In reading his more elaborate statement of the plans of which the
above is an outline, one cannot help thinking how unfortunate for
him it was that he did not give them to Mr. Davis as fully as he
gave them to Hood! In answer to the pressing inquiry of the 16th for
"your plan of operations so specifically as will enable me to
anticipate events," he had replied, "As the enemy has double our
number, we must be on the defensive. My plan of operations must
therefore depend upon that of the enemy. It is mainly to watch for
an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are trying to put Atlanta
in condition to be held for a day or two by the Georgia militia,
that army movements may be freer and wider." [Footnote: _Id_., p.
883.] A good understanding with his government was so essential,
just then, that the most reticent of commanders would have been wise
in sending in cipher the whole page in which he tells the specific
details of his purposes and their alternates as he gave them to
Hood. Had he done so, it is quite safe to say that he would not have
been removed; but reading, in the light of the whole season's
correspondence, the dispatch he actually sent, we cannot say that
Mr. Davis was unreasonable in finding it confirm his previous
apprehension. Had the general fully and frankly opened to Bragg the
same purposes, the latter could not have sent the hopeless message
which clinched the President's decision.

Johnston said in his final message to Davis that the enemy had
advanced more rapidly and penetrated deeper into Virginia than into
Georgia; and that confident language by a military commander is not
usually regarded as evidence of competency. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 888.] There was much force in both
points, but they do not touch the heart of the matter. Between Lee
and his government there was always a frank and cordial comparison
of views and perfect understanding; so that even in disaster it was
seen that he had done the best he could and was actively planning to
repair a mischief. On the other hand, they got from Johnston little
but a diarist's briefest chronicle of events with no word of hopeful
purpose or plan. It was not necessary that he should use "confident
language," but words were certainly called for which expressed
intelligent comprehension of the situation and fertility in purposed
action according to probable contingencies. His advice to Hood
showed that he only needed to be equally frank with the Richmond
authorities. [Footnote: Mr. Davis has discussed his relations to
Johnston in chapter xlviii. of his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government," vol. ii. pp. 547, etc.; but the most succinct statement
of his views is found in a paper prepared for the Confederate
Congress, but withheld. See his letter to Colonel Phelan, Meridian,
Miss., O. R, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. pp. 1303-1311.]

The assignment of Hood to the command was, of course, in the belief
that he would take a more energetic and aggressive course. He seems
to have been free in his criticisms of his commander, and upon
Bragg's arrival had addressed to him a letter which it is hard to
view as anything else than a bid for the command. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. v. p. 880.] It said Johnston had
failed to use several opportunities to strike Sherman decisive
blows; that yet the losses of the army were 20,000; that under no
circumstances should the enemy be allowed to occupy Atlanta; that if
Sherman should establish his line at the Chattahoochee, he must be
attacked by crossing that river; that he had so often urged
aggressive action that he was regarded as reckless by "the officers
high in rank in this army, who are declared to hold directly
opposite views." He concluded by saying that he regarded it a great
misfortune that battle was not given to the enemy many miles north
of the present position.

When Johnston learned from Hood's report [Footnote: _Id._, pt. iii.
p. 628.](dated February 15, 1865) the nature of the latter's
statements and criticisms, he notified the Richmond government as
well as Hood that he should demand that the latter be brought before
a court-martial; [Footnote: Id., p. 637.] but it was then April, on
the very eve of the collapse of the Confederacy, and the discussion
was left for continuance in the private writings of the parties and
their friends. Johnston affirmed that in the only instances in the
campaign in which it could be said that a favorable opportunity for
battle had not been seized, Hood himself had been prominent in
protesting against an engagement or had himself failed to carry out
the orders given. In his service as commander of the army, Hood
became involved in disputes as to fact with Hardee and Cheatham as
well as with Johnston, and the result was damaging to his reputation
for accuracy and candor. [Footnote: Johnston's case is stated in his
"Narrative," chapters x. and xi.; Hood's in his "Advance and
Retreat," chapters v. to ix. In connection with these, Hardee's
Report of April 5, 1865, is of interest (Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iii. p. 697), and his letter to General Mackall (_Id._,
pt. v. p. 987).]

The change of commanders undoubtedly precipitated the ruin of the
Confederate cause; yet we must in candor admit that the situation
was becoming so portentous that human wisdom might be overtaxed in
trying to determine what course to take. Of one thing there is no
shadow of doubt. We of the National Army in Georgia regarded the
removal of Johnston as equivalent to a victory for us. Three months
of sharp work had convinced us that a change from Johnston's methods
to those which Hood was likely to employ, was, in homely phrase, to
have our enemy grasp the hot end of the poker. We knew that we
should be kept on the alert and must be watchful; but we were
confident that a system of aggression and a succession of attacks
would soon destroy the Confederate army. Of course Hood did not mean
to assault solidly built intrenchments; but we knew that we could
make good enough cover whilst he was advancing against a flank, to
insure him a bloody repulse. The dense forests made the artillery of
little effect in demolishing the works or weakening the _morale_ of
the defenders, and it was essentially an infantry attack upon
intrenched infantry and artillery at close range.

The action of the Confederate government was a confession that
Sherman's methods had brought about the very result he aimed at. The
enemy had been manoeuvred from position to position until he must
either give up Atlanta with its important nucleus of railway
communications and abandon all northern Georgia and Alabama, or he
must assume a desperate aggressive with a probability that this
would fatally reduce his army and make the result only the more
completely ruinous. This was the meaning of the substitution of Hood
for Johnston.