ATLANTA CAMPAIGN: DALTON AND RESACA

The opposing forces--North Georgia
triangle--Topography--Dalton--Army of the Ohio enters
Georgia--Positions of the other armies--Turning Tunnel Hill--First
meeting with Sherman--Thomas--Sherman's plan as to
Dalton--McPherson's orders and movement--Those of Thomas and
Schofield--Hopes of a decisive engagement--Thomas attacks north end
of Rocky Face--Opdycke on the ridge--Developing Johnston's
lines--Schofield's advance on 9th May--The flanking march through
Snake Creek Gap--Retiring movement of my division--Passing
lines--Johnston's view of the situation--Use of temporary
intrenchments and barricades--Passing the Snake Creek defile--Camp
Creek line--A wheel in line--Rough march of left flank--Battle of
Resaca--Crossing Camp Creek--Storming Confederate line--My division
relieved by Newton's--Incidents--Further advance of left
flank--Progress of right flank--Johnston retreats.

The history of the campaigns of 1864-1865 under Sherman have been
given in another form, and I need not repeat the narrative of the
connected movements of his forces. [Footnote: See "Atlanta," and
"The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville."] I shall confine
myself to the more personal view of events as they came under my own
eye, and to such additional knowledge as the publication of the
Records has brought within our reach.

Nashville and Chattanooga, being large depots of supply, were
fortified and furnished with garrisons. A few other points had also
to be garrisoned in some force, besides the numerous small posts and
blockhouses. But after all deductions, Sherman still expected to
take the field with an army of a hundred thousand men of all arms,
and this was what he did. His returns for the 30th of April show his
strength to have been 93,131 infantry, 12,455 cavalry, and 4537
artillery. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. i. p.
115.] His cavalry were not all at the front, and fell short of the
nominal strength. [Footnote: Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 23, 24; Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 26.]

General Johnston's similar returns for the end of April show his
army actually present at Dalton to have consisted of 54,500
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, not including part of a brigade at
Resaca and some detachments _en route_. [Footnote: _Id._, vol.
xxxii. pt. iii. p. 866.] General Polk was on his way to join with
14,000 men, [Footnote: _Id._, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 670, 737,
740.] and these with about 5000 increase of Hardee's and Hood's
corps reached Johnston before he was seriously engaged with Sherman,
giving him an army of 75,000 men. [Footnote: For a careful analysis
of these forces, see "Century War Book," vol. iv. p. 281, a
statistical paper by Major E. C. Dawes; also "Atlanta," Appendix A.
For the meaning of "effective total" in Confederate returns, see
_ante_, p. 482.] The Richmond government only delayed ordering Polk
to join Johnston until it was certain that Sherman intended to
operate with a single army upon the Atlanta line, and Polk went even
beyond what they seemed to expect of him in carrying the troops of
his department to the army at Dalton.

Although he was not aware of the urgency of the Confederate
government with Johnston to induce him to take the initiative and
operate by turning our left flank, Sherman had considered the
possibility of this. The Fourth Corps had been concentrated at
Cleveland on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railway about a dozen
miles north of the Georgia state line and thirty-five miles from
Dalton. The line of this railway was the easy road out of northern
Georgia into Tennessee, and pretty closely followed the old Federal
road. Had Johnston marched northward, he must have taken this route,
and would have found his way barred by the Fourth Corps, which was
strong enough to retard his advance till Sherman could have
concentrated to meet him. The railways made a nearly equilateral
triangle of the country between Cleveland, Chattanooga, and Dalton.
It was thirty-eight miles from Chattanooga to Dalton, and
twenty-seven to Cleveland. The east side of the triangle was near
the Cooyehuttee Creek, a stream heading quite close to Cleveland and
uniting, below Dalton, with the Connasauga. This valley is narrow
west of the river, and is, much of the way, separated by a high and
sharp ridge from the very broken country, which makes up the greater
part of the triangle, where the branches of the Chickamauga run
northward in parallel valleys till they unite near Chattanooga, and
empty into the Tennessee. For nearly forty miles, therefore, the
waters on the east side of the dividing ridge run southward to the
Gulf of Mexico, whilst on the west side they run northward to the
Ohio.

Going south from Chattanooga, the railroad and the wagon roads have
to thread their way from one valley to another, the latter climbing
painfully the high ridges intervening, the former taking shorter
cuts by deep excavations and tunnels. Within sight of Chattanooga
the north end of Missionary Ridge is pierced for the railway where
Grant's left wing fought in the battle which closed General Bragg's
career as a commander in the field. Some twenty miles further on,
another ridge is tunnelled where the railroad passes from the
Chickamauga valley into that of Mill Creek, a small tributary of the
Cooyehuttee, flowing eastward into that river in front of Dalton.
Here, at Tunnel Hill, had been Johnston's advanced post during the
winter, and Thomas's had been above Ringgold on the top of Taylor's
ridge facing it on the west. But as Tunnel Hill did not extend many
miles northward, and could be turned in that direction, the
Confederates had made Dalton their intrenched camp, and were
prepared to retire from Tunnel Hill whenever Sherman should advance
in force.

[Illustration: Map]

The position at Dalton was an impregnable one to an attack in front
on the Chattanooga road. Mill Creek breaks through the Chattanooga
Mountains (here known by the local name of Rocky Face), by a crooked
gorge flanked by precipitous cliffs called the Buzzards Roost. The
west side of Rocky Face is a nearly perpendicular wall, and in the
Mill Creek gorge, spurs from the sides so project as to enfilade the
entrance like bastions. A little north of the gorge a larger spur
from the ridge runs down to the east, connecting with a subordinate
parallel ridge, and from the lower slope a line of heavy earthworks
continued the defences toward the Cooyehuttee. Mill Creek had been
dammed so as to make an inundation in the gorge, and the
Confederates held the ridge and cliffs on both sides as well as the
fortified line in the lower ground. Some three miles north of Mill
Creek Gap, Rocky Face and Tunnel Hill break down into smaller
disconnected hills, and here about Catoosa Springs a bit of more
open country made a practicable connection between the centre of the
Union Army at Ringgold and its left wing advancing from Cleveland.
Johnston hoped that Sherman would dash himself against the walls of
Rocky Face and suffer severe loss in doing so; and if the ridge was
turned on the north by part of the Union Army, this wing would find
itself in presence of the strong earthworks skirting Mill Creek, and
would be so separated from the centre that he could reasonably hope
to crush it. Sherman, of course, could know little of the
Confederate position till he was near enough to reconnoitre it, and
must find out by experiment how the nut was to be cracked.

On Thursday, the 5th of May, the Army of the Ohio under General
Schofield was at Red Clay, a hamlet just south of the Georgia state
line. My own division (the third) was encamped a mile in advance, at
some springs which furnished a good supply of water. General Judah's
division (the second) was at Red Clay. General Hovey's division (the
first) was still at Blue Springs, Tennessee, covering the army
trains and the repairs of the railway. The cavalry covered the left
flank and reconnoitred forward toward Varnell's Station, skirmishing
with the enemy's horse. The valley was a narrow one, tributary to
the principal valley of the Connasauga, and, near my camp, was
filled with a dense thicket of loblolly pine, a second growth which
came up in the exhausted light soil of abandoned fields, and which
we were to become very familiar with as we advanced into Georgia. As
we could not see out in any direction except that of the road, I
covered my front with a slashing of the trees by way of a rough
abatis to prevent a surprise. We were now the left flank of the
grand army.

When we passed Cleveland, the Fourth Corps took up its line of
march, bearing away to the westward of ours and went into position
at Catoosa Springs, about eight miles southwest of Red Clay, with a
ridge intervening. Here General Howard became the left of the Army
of the Cumberland, having Palmer's Corps (the Fourteenth), next
beyond him facing Tunnel Hill, and Hooker's (the Twentieth) still
farther to the southwest, marching by way of Woods Station over
Taylor's Ridge upon Trickum in the upper valley of the East
Chickamauga. Thomas's army was the heavy centre of the grand army,
and his infantry was about two-thirds of the whole. This great
preponderance of one organization was faulty in a purely military
point of view, but Grant and Sherman both felt that it would not be
wise to disturb the _esprit de corps_ of the Cumberland Army by
subdividing it, or to offend Thomas by diminishing it, and, anyhow,
no such change could have been made without the concurrence of the
President.

General McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was to constitute
Sherman's right, but was a little delayed in its concentration. At
this time it contained only Logan's Corps (the Fifteenth) and the
left wing of the Sixteenth (Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge in
command). It was moving behind the Army of the Cumberland, to Lee
and Gordon's Mills, and thence upon Villanow. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 39.] General Kenner Garrard's
strong division of cavalry accompanied McPherson's movement.

Sherman was anxious to allow the enemy as little time for
preparation as might be, yet, as he had to give McPherson a day or
two to come into line, he set Saturday the 7th of May as the time
for the more complete concentration, and an attack upon Tunnel Hill
if Johnston should continue to hold it. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 38.]
Accordingly, on Saturday morning all the columns were in motion.
Palmer advanced against the ridge of Tunnel Hill in front, and
Howard coming from the north turned the flank of the ridge. The hill
was held by the Confederate cavalry under Wheeler, supported by
Stewart's division of infantry, who were ordered to resist our
advance with stubbornness enough to force the display of Thomas's
forces. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 672.] A lively skirmishing fight was
kept up till Howard's men advanced toward the flank and rear of the
position, when the enemy retreated within Mill Creek Gap. Wheeler
was ordered to let a brigade of cavalry retire up the valley of Mill
Creek, outside of Rocky Face, and to cover Dug Gap, through which
runs the road from Villanow to Dalton. [Footnote: _Ibid_.]

My division marched from its camp in front of Red Clay over the
ridge by Ellidge's Mill to Dr. Lee's on the main road from Varnell's
Station to Ringgold, and near the northern end of Tunnel Hill ridge.
Here we came into close connection with the Fourth Corps. The rest
of the Army of the Ohio followed, the rear-guard holding a gap
looking eastward above Ellidge's Mill, and the cavalry covering the
front and flank to Varnell's Station. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 48, 54.]
Our supply station was moved over to Ringgold on the Chattanooga
line, and the railroad at Red Clay was soon abandoned. In the
movement all the division commanders were ordered to report to me in
the absence of General Schofield.

At Dr. Lee's I met Sherman and Thomas for the first time. They had
come over from Ringgold to reconnoitre for themselves and observe
the effect of Howard's movement turning Tunnel Hill. The house stood
upon a knoll looking southward over farm fields and rolling country
to the sharp end of Rocky Face, and when my column halted near by, I
rode forward with General Schofield to meet the army commander. It
was a bright May morning, and a picturesque group was gathered on
the sloping lawn in front of the house. The principal officers were
dismounted, their horses and escort in the background. An occasional
puff of white smoke on the slope of Tunnel Hill in the distance
marked the attack going on there, but it was too far away for the
cannonade to be more than a muffled sound, not interrupting the
conversation. Sherman was tall, lithe, and active, with light brown
hair, close-cropped sandy beard and moustache, and every motion and
expression indicated eagerness and energy. His head was apt to be
bent a little forward as if in earnest outlook or aggressive
advance, and his rapid incisive utterance hit off the topics of
discussion in a sharp and telling way. His opinions usually took a
strong and very pronounced form, full of the feeling that was for
the moment uppermost, not hesitating at even a little humorous
extravagance if it added point to his statement; but in such cases
the keen eye took a merry twinkle accentuated by the crow-foot lines
in the corner, so that the real geniality and kindliness that
underlay the brusque exterior were sufficiently apparent. The
general effect was of a nature of intense, restless activity, both
physical and mental. In conversation he poured out a wealth of
original and striking ideas, from a full experience, observation,
and reading; his assertions would be strong and confident, highly
colored by the glow of momentary feeling, unsoftened by the
modifications and exceptions which have to tame down broad
generalizations before they are put in practice. One did not know
him long before discovering that in responsible action he did not
lack the prudence which took all probable contingencies into
account. His practical work in the field was never reckless, but his
boldest outlines of plan were worked out with thoughtful caution in
detail and full provision for possible disappointment. When
discussing a situation with his familiars, after strongly stating
his own view he would add, "Now what is Joe Johnston's game?" and he
would analyze his adversary's possible moves with a candor and
insight that left no doubt of his full comprehension of the problem
before him. In carrying out a plan he was free from the common
weakness of giving increased weight to doubts when the conflict is
joined, and making a timid execution of a strong purpose; he knew
when it was time for debate to stop (even with his own thoughts),
and to bend every energy to decisive action. All this was, of
course, not visible in the first meeting at Dr. Lee's, but no one
could doubt that here was a most original and interesting character,
and I soon acquired an undoubting conviction that of all the men I
had met, he was the one to whose leadership in war I would commit my
own life and the lives of my men with most complete confidence. In
him the combination of intellectual insight with fertility of
invention and with force of will in execution was of the highest
order. I felt that if the end we aimed at was a noble and worthy
one, the price he asked us to pay was reasonable, and the object was
worth the sacrifices he called for: we were therefore enthusiastic
in our obedience.

General Thomas was in person and manner a strong contrast to
Sherman. Equally tall, he was large and solidly stout, with an air
of dignified quiet and deliberation. His full beard was not of so
stubbly a cut as Sherman's, his countenance was almost impassive,
and the lines of his brow gave an air of sternness. His part in the
conversation was less, his words much fewer and less expressive, but
always clear and intelligent. His manner was kindly, but rather
reserved, and one felt that his acquaintance must be gradually
cultivated. His reputation for cool intrepidity and stubborn
tenacity could not be excelled, and no soldier could approach him
without a deep interest and respect that was not diminished by his
natural modesty of demeanor. Better acquaintance with him made one
learn that his intellect was strong and broad, and his mind had been
expanded by general reading, with some special scientific tastes
beyond his military profession. He was a noble model of patriotic
devotion to country, and of the private virtues that make a great
citizen. His military career had been an important one from the
beginning of the war. Second in rank in the armies of Buell and
Rosecrans in 1862 and 1863, at the great battles of Stone's River
and Chickamauga he had held his wing of the army defiant and
invincible when other parts were swept back by the Confederate
impetuosity. No sobriquet conferred by an admiring soldiery was more
characteristic than the "Rock of Chickamauga." Between him and
Sherman the old affection of schoolmates at the Military Academy was
still warm. Sherman still called him "Tom," the nickname of cadet
days, and Thomas evidently enjoyed, in his quiet way, the vivacious
talk and brilliant ideas of his old friend, now his commander. His
army so much outnumbered the organizations of McPherson and
Schofield that, as a massive centre, it was necessarily the chief
reliance of Sherman for the results of the campaign, and was
personified in its leader's weight and deliberation; while the
lighter organizations of the Tennessee and the Ohio were thrown from
flank to flank in zigzag movements from one strategic position to
another as we penetrated into Georgia.

Grant's plan of having the armies of the East and West begin
simultaneous movements on the first days of May had been responded
to by Sherman with the information that on the first of the month
his three armies were in mutual support, and that he would "draw the
enemy's fire within twenty-four hours of May 5th." [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 1.] The delay in
McPherson's reaching his position, slight as it was, had to be
considered in ordering other movements in view of the promise to
Grant to get into immediate contact with the enemy, and helped in
the decision to let Thomas's army advance strongly in the centre and
engage the enemy if the chance seemed at all favorable, while
McPherson made the flanking movement by way of Snake Creek Gap. On
the 4th Sherman had telegraphed Grant that he would "first secure
the Tunnel Hill, then throw McPherson rapidly on his (the enemy's)
communications, attacking at the same time cautiously and in force."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 25.]

McPherson's orders went to him on the evening of the 5th, directing
that whilst the movements of Thomas and Schofield already described
were in progress, on Saturday the 7th he should "secure Snake Creek
Gap, and from it make a bold attack on the enemy's flank or his
railroad at any point between Tilton and Resaca." [Footnote: _Id_.,
p. 39.] Sherman expressed the hope that Johnston would fight at
Dalton, but should he fall back along the railroad McPherson was to
hit him in flank. "Do not fail, in that event," he continued, "to
make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack
possible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend, a
slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it." McPherson
was assured that Thomas and Schofield would prevent Johnston from
turning on him alone, and the sound of battle at the north would
show the greater necessity for rapid movement on the railroad. "If
once broken to an extent that would take them days to repair, you
can withdraw to Snake Creek Gap, and come to us or await the
development according to your judgment or information you may
receive." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 39.]

Sherman's orders to Thomas were to take Tunnel Hill, and threaten
Dalton in front, but not to attack its defences "unless the enemy
assume the offensive against either of our wings, when all must
attack directly in front toward the enemy's main army, and not
without orders detach to the relief of the threatened wing."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 40.] With similar orders to Schofield, Sherman
added: "As soon as Tunnel Hill is secured to us, I shall pause to
give McPherson time for his long march; but we must occupy the
attention of all the enemy, lest he turn his whole force on
McPherson, which must be prevented. Therefore, on the sound of heavy
battle always close up on Howard and act according to circumstances.
We will not be able to detach to McPherson's assistance, but can
press so closely from this direction that he (Johnston) cannot
detach but a part of his command against him." [Footnote: _Id_., p.
38.]

These lucid orders show that Sherman was not contemplating merely a
flanking movement to make Johnston retreat and yield territory; on
the other hand he strongly expressed the desirability of forcing
conclusions as near his own base as possible, and showed his
apprehension of the disadvantages which must come from stretching
still further his long line of communications. The same desire and
the same apprehension were constant with him throughout the
campaign, and it was with an unwillingness growing at times into
impatience that he found himself compelled to follow Johnston's slow
and skilful retreat. It was not till the change of the Confederate
commanders that aggressive tactics on the part of the enemy gave the
opportunity for severe punishment and led to the speedy destruction
of the hostile army. Herein lies the key of the whole campaign.

The possession of Tunnel Hill enabled Sherman to look into Mill
Creek Gap, the break in Rocky Face, and the first look was enough to
show how desperate would be an attack either upon the precipitous
cliffs or into the fortified gorge. His orders for the 8th of May
were for Thomas to threaten the Buzzard Roost pass and try to get a
small force on Rocky Face ridge. Schofield from Dr. Lee's was to
feel along the same ridge southward toward the gap and the signal
station which the enemy had established above it on Buzzard Roost.
It was to be a skirmishing advance, but no battle, attracting the
enemy's attention whilst McPherson was seizing on Snake Creek Gap in
Johnston's rear. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
p. 56.]

On our part, Schofield ordered Judah's division to ascend the north
point of Rocky Face and press along the sharp ridge southward. My
own division was to occupy the passes looking toward Varnell's
Station, sending a regiment to support the cavalry there. [Footnote:
_Id_., pp. 55, 66, 85.] General Thomas, seeing no chance of getting
to the top of Rocky Face from the west, had ordered the Fourth Corps
to attempt it from the north, and Howard had sent in Newton's
division to do this before Schofield received his orders for the
day. The latter therefore put Judah's division in support of
Newton's, extending the line along the east base of the ridge, and
called up Hovey's division into close support. With my own division
I advanced southeastwardly to hills in that direction, keeping
abreast of the movement on Rocky Face. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 82, 83;
pt. ii. p. 675.]

Sherman had conjectured that the hill-tops would be found to be
plateaus on which troops might manoeuvre to some extent, but they
proved to be sharp and steep to the very summits, and composed of
loose rock of every size, but all as angular as if from fresh
cleavage. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 675;
pt. iv. p. 84.] Harker's brigade of Newton's division had the
advance, but even a brigade was too large a body for combined
action, and Colonel Opdycke with his regiment (One Hundred and
Twenty-fifth Ohio) took the lead. He made a demonstration as if to
turn the north point and go up the eastern side; then leaving the
brigade skirmish line to continue to push there, he rapidly moved
again to the west side and climbed swiftly to the ridge. Here was
only room for four men to march abreast, but charging from rock to
rock he succeeded in advancing about a third of a mile southward
along the ridge to a breastwork of stone where the enemy, who had
fought bravely for every "coign of vantage," were finally enabled to
check him. He also threw together a heap of stones to cover and
enable him to hold the ground he had gained. [Footnote: _Id_., pt.
i. p. 367.]

Schofield in person had followed the advance of Judah's division,
and reconnoitred along the ridge parallel to Rocky Face on the east.
It was plain that there was little chance of getting near Buzzard
Roost by following Harker's path along the knife-like summit, and he
was disposed to let Judah try the effect of a night attack upon the
fortified outpost at the enemy's signal station in front of Harker.
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 83.] Sherman realized that he could not
hope to carry the Dalton lines from the west and north, and that
Johnston was too well satisfied with his defensive position to leave
it unless some part of our army was compromised by making a false
move. McPherson, however, was entering Snake Creek Gap with so
little opposition as to show that the importance of that pass was
not understood by Johnston, if indeed he knew of its existence.
Sherman therefore determined to keep up active demonstrations with
watchful observation of the enemy for another day, whilst the
decisive part of McPherson's movement should go on, and was already
planning to transfer Hooker's Corps to McPherson's column as soon as
the latter should hold the outlet of his gap. He wrote to Schofield,
"We must not let Johnston amuse us here by a small force whilst he
turns on McPherson." He sometimes suspected this was being done, and
had been uneasy during the day at the absence of cannonade from
Johnston's lines. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 83, 84.] The orders for the 9th were that Thomas should continue
to push along the crest of Rocky Face from the north and make
demonstrations on other parts of his line, whilst Schofield
cautiously swung his left flank out toward the east at right angles
to the principal ridge and made a strong reconnoissance of the
enemy's lines in the immediate front of the town. At midnight
Sherman learned that Hooker had made an effort to carry Rocky Face
at Dug Gap, two or three miles south of Buzzard Roost, and had
failed with considerable loss to Geary's division, which was
engaged.

At daybreak on the 9th, my own camp was astir. The division advanced
beyond the left flank of the position of Hovey's, then swung the
left forward and moved southward astride of the ridge parallel to
Rocky Face on the east. Judah's division connected our movement with
the left flank of the Fourth Corps across the intervening valley.
Hovey's division marched in rear of my left flank as a reserve.
McCook's division of cavalry covered the extreme flank at Varnell's
Station, under orders to demonstrate on the direct road to Dalton as
our infantry advanced. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 98-100.] The enemy
resisted with strong outposts and skirmish lines posted in several
strong barricades of timber and stones. We drove him from these and
continued the movement till we confronted the main line of
intrenchments. Schofield intended to attack these as soon as
Newton's division of the Fourth Corps (which was our pivot) should
be able to force the position in its immediate front on the crest of
Rocky Face, but Newton was obliged to report that Harker's brigade
had failed in its effort, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii.
pt. iv. p. 102.] and Schofield ordered us to stand fast where we
were.

McCook had found a superior force of Confederate cavalry under
Wheeler on the Dalton road; his advanced brigade under Colonel La
Grange had been roughly handled, and that officer was captured.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 96.] General Stoneman was, however, advancing
from Charleston with the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio, and the
affair was of no great significance, though the Confederates claimed
a considerable victory for their horse. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 683.]

Our movement had been an interesting one. As we went forward on the
ridge, we could see Judah's line keeping pace with us in the valley
and on the lower slopes of Rocky Face, whilst Newton's men continued
the line to the summit, where Harker was having a sharp combat in
which both artillery and small arms were brought into play. Off
beyond our left was a separate rounded height, Potato Hill, on which
the enemy had artillery which annoyed us, and to which our own guns
answered. The space between was filled with skirmishers, horse and
foot, and a rattling fusillade accompanied our march. It was evident
that the lines before us were very formidable and held in force, and
that the reconnoissance had been pushed as far as possible; to go
further would commit us to a desperate attack upon intrenchments.
[Footnote: When Johnston's retreat gave us possession of Dalton, we
found the works of a very strong character, putting that front quite
beyond a _coup-de-main_. I examined them myself later in the
campaign.] But Sherman did not desire to do this. He wished to keep
the enemy employed so that he could not send a great force against
McPherson, and thus to give the latter a chance to make a success of
the movement against Resaca. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 98.] Toward evening he directed Schofield to
fall back to a strong defensive position again, as from the news he
got from McPherson he was sure Johnston must either attack us or
retreat on the next day, and he wished to be ready for a prompt
transfer of his army to Snake Creek Gap. But Schofield thought a
night movement too uncertain in that broken and tangled country,
especially as he had not been pleased with the handling of Hovey's
division during the day, and obtained permission to bivouac for the
night where we were, sending a couple of infantry regiments to
support McCook's cavalry and cover our flank. [Footnote: _Id_., pp.
99, 119.]

During the night Sherman learned that McPherson had not succeeded in
taking Resaca or breaking the railroad, and had retired to the mouth
of Snake Creek Gap. Johnston was, of course, now aware of the
turning movement, and before morning we had evidence that he was
changing the positions of his army to meet the new situation.
Sherman immediately turned his whole energy to transferring his army
to McPherson's position. Hooker's Corps leading off was followed by
Palmer's, and this by ours. Howard's was ordered to remain in
position covering the Chattanooga railway, and to follow Johnston
directly through Dalton when he left his intrenchments. The movement
could not be begun till the 11th, as Stoneman with the cavalry of
the Army of the Ohio was marching from Cleveland, and another day
was needed to enable him to get upon our left flank, the place
assigned him in the combined advance. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 112,
113, 126.] Three days' rations in haversacks and seven more in
wagons gave provisions for a short separation from our base, and
orders to send back all baggage to Ringgold were strictly enforced.

At daybreak of the 10th I advanced my skirmishers to reconnoitre the
enemy's lines, which were found to be still held in force, and his
troops on the alert. We then proceeded to wheel the whole of the
corps backward in line of battle, ready to halt at any moment, and
engage the enemy if he should come out and attack us. My division
being on the flank, it was to regulate the movement, Judah's
conforming to mine on the right, and Hovey's in reserve immediately
in rear of mine. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 123, 131.] We were under a warm skirmish fire of infantry in
front, and the enemy's cavalry on our left flank also followed up
the movement sharply. Reinforcing the skirmish line till the enemy
was driven back, a good position in rear was selected for my second
line and it was made to lie down. My first line was then marched
slowly to the rear over the other, to another position, where it
halted and lay down in turn, whilst the other rose and marched to
the rear in a similar manner. Making the troops lie down avoided the
danger, incident to such a manoeuvre under fire, that the men in
second line would be confused by the passing of the first line
through their ranks and break their organization. [Footnote:
Officers experienced in war know that manoeuvres which are easy and
of fine effect on parade are difficult and even dangerous under
fire, and that it is wise to simplify the tactics as much as
possible. Marshal Saint-Cyr, whose reputation for tactical skill was
second to none in the wars of the French Republic and Empire, thus
speaks of the matter in his comments on the battle of Novi, apropos
to the break of the French division Watrin, which was in two brigade
lines: "La premiere, attaquee avec vigueur par le general Lusignan
appuye par Laudon, ne soutint qu'un moment le choc, et se rabattit
sur la seconde; elle esperait se reformer en arriere de celle-ci, en
faisant ce qu'on appelle une passage de ligne; mais il fut demontre
une fois de plus, que cette manoeuvre, qui fait un assez bel effet a
la parade, ne peut reussir a la guerre lorsqu'on est suivi par un
ennemi actif. La premiere entraina la seconde dans un mouvement
retrograde; de plus elle y apporta assez de confusion pour que ces
deux lignes reunies crussent n'avoir d'autre parti a prendre que
celui de la fuite," etc. Memoires, vol. i. p. 257. There can be no
question as to the general soundness of this criticism, and we
should not have continued the movement described if we had been
attacked in force. We should then have fought where we stood,
bringing the reserves to support the front line. It justifies,
however, the precaution of selecting carefully the alternate
positions and making the rear line lie down.] When we came opposite
the positions assigned us in the extension of the Fourth Corps line,
the division changed front to rear on right battalion and so swung
into its place. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii.
p. 675.] Sherman had sent Captain Poe, his chief engineer, to
observe our movement from the crest of Rocky Face held by Newton's
troops, and congratulated Schofield upon it, saying it "was
described to me by Captain Poe, as seen from the mountain, as very
handsome." [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 121.] In his full report
made at the close of the campaign, General Schofield referred to it
as "a delicate and difficult one, owing to the character of the
ground, the position and strength of the enemy, and our comparative
isolation from the main army." He adds: "I regarded it as a complete
test of the quality of my troops, which I had not before had
opportunity of seeing manoeuvre in presence of the enemy."
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii. p. 510.]

Schofield had been so dissatisfied with General Hovey that on the
same day he asked to have him removed from the command of the
division, notwithstanding his high personal esteem for him and his
confidence in his personal gallantry. The trouble seemed to be in
the comprehension of orders and in the grasp of the surrounding
circumstances. Sherman did not feel at liberty to act on the
request, as Hovey had been assigned to the new division, before it
took the field, in fulfilment of a promise of General Grant under
whom Hovey had served in the Vicksburg campaign, and had been
recommended for promotion as a recognition of good conduct at the
affair of Champion Hill. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 122.
Brigadier-General Alvin P. Hovey had been a Judge of the Supreme
Court of Indiana, and a "War Democrat" in politics. His subsequent
withdrawal from the army and his connection with Sherman's famous
protest against promotions given under stress of personal and
political influences at Washington would not be entirely clear
without mention of the incident here told.]

Johnston seems to have heard rumors of Sherman's original plan to
send McPherson's column against Rome, much further in rear, and he
remained under the impression that this was the meaning of the
movements he now heard of, until McPherson was in possession of
Snake Creek Gap. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv.
pp. 674, 675.] On the 7th he had urged Polk to hasten his
concentration at Rome, and ordered Martin's division of cavalry to
Calhoun to cover the communications with Polk, and protect the
railroad south of the Oostanaula. Brigadier-General Cantey was at
Resaca with at least four thousand men, his own and Reynolds's
brigades with fourteen pieces of artillery. [Footnote: _Id_., pp.
679, 682.] Movements toward his rear were reported to Johnston, and
all his subordinates were on the alert to find out what it meant;
the cavalry was ordered to watch all gaps south of Dug Gap, but no
mention is made of Snake Creek Gap till McPherson had passed through
it. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 681, 683, 686, 687.] Then Cantey was told
to hold Resaca firmly, and call on Martin for assistance if he
needed it. Cars were sent to bring a brigade from Rome,
intrenchments were made to cover the south end of the Resaca bridge;
Major Presstman, chief engineer, was sent to mark out more extensive
works about Resaca, and Hood was ordered there with considerable
reinforcements. As soon, however, as it was known that McPherson had
retired to Sugar Valley, Hood was called back to Dalton, and
Johnston requested Polk to hasten in person to Resaca and take
command, hurrying forward his corps as fast as possible. [Footnote:
_Id_., pp. 687, 689.] This was the situation on the evening of the
10th of May.

When we took our position on the ridge of Rocky Face as the left of
the line, the division was somewhat exposed to a flank attack, and I
ordered the fallen timber on the hillside to be thrown together to
make obstruction to any hostile advance, besides the usual tactical
precautions of outposts and reserves. This, like the slashing made
at Red Clay a few days before, was suggested by the difficulty of
knowing what was going on around us in a country covered by dense
forests with only small cultivated openings here and there. In this
instance it was only the gathering of logs and tree-tops already
lying on the ground, and utilizing them as a means of delaying an
enemy till our lines could be formed. From such beginnings grew up
our more and more elaborate system of intrenched camps; a natural
evolution of campaigning in a country only partially cleared, with
no roads worthy of the name.

To pass such a defile as Snake Creek Gap with an army was no small
undertaking. Hooker was ordered to clear a second track, so that two
lines could march by the flank at once, but this could only be
imperfectly done in the time at command. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. iv. pp. 126, 135, 145.] Careful orders in
detail were made, fixing the time for each corps and division to
move, keeping the roads filled night and day. Wagons were sent by
the rear to Villanow, and the regular subsistence trains were
stopped at Ringgold and Tunnel Hill till the Confederate army should
be dislodged. For night marching men were stationed with torches at
the forking of paths, and boards were nailed to trees as
finger-posts.

Early on the morning of the 12th May, my division left its position
on Rocky Face and marched through Tunnel Hill station. General
Schofield, finding the shorter road to Snake Creek Gap blocked by
wagons of the Cumberland Army, ordered a detour to the west, and we
marched over to the Trickum and Villanow road, some two miles, and
then pushing southward got within three miles of Villanow. It was
evident that our movement and that of the whole army were visible
from the high ridge of Rocky Face. Johnston was aware of them, and
telegraphed to Richmond that Sherman was moving to Calhoun or to
some point on the Oostanaula. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxxviii. pt. iv. p. 698.] He put everything in motion upon his
interior line to Resaca, and the last of his infantry left Dalton
that night, covered by a cavalry rear-guard. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
160.] Howard entered the place next morning.

[Illustration: Map]

Taking only a short rest, my division marched again at one o'clock
through Villanow and Snake Creek Gap into Sugar Valley, followed by
Judah's division of our corps, the other (Hovey's) being left to
guard the gap and the trains. McPherson's army covered the direct
road to Resaca, having Kilpatrick's cavalry on its right flank
toward the Oostanaula; Thomas's army was in the centre, consisting
of two corps (Hooker's and Palmer's) in Howard's absence; and
Schofield was ordered to continue the curve to the left, my own
division being the flank and directed to rest the left upon the
ridge or near it, facing northward.

The different corps advanced from McPherson's intrenchments to the
new line which was near Camp Creek on the Resaca road, facing east,
thence curving north and west through a quarter circle to my
position on the left close to the dominant ridge, and about four
miles north of Sugar Valley P. O. on the main Dalton road. I sent
Hanson's brigade forward to reconnoitre toward Tilton (where Howard
was), and it reached Martin's store, at the forks of the Dalton and
Tilton roads and the crossing of Swamp Creek. A Confederate division
had left that position only an hour before, marching toward Resaca.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 675. In the
official Atlas (compiled after the war), plate lvii. map 2, Martin's
Store is given as Roberts' Store, and the position of the enemy
there is marked.]

Later in the afternoon the centre and left of the whole army swung
forward toward the east into the line along Camp Creek, quite away
from the Dalton road. Reilly's brigade of my division was therefore
left as a detachment covering that road until we should know that
Howard had advanced beyond Tilton. A regiment of Hanson's brigade
was left as an outpost at Martin's store, and the rest of the
brigade marched across country by the right of companies to the
front, keeping touch with Judah's division and this with the left of
the Army of the Cumberland. It was a rough march over ridges and
streams through the forest, on the long outer curve, of which the
pivot was several miles to the southeast.

Sherman had hoped to be in time to interpose between Resaca and
Johnston's army, as he had said in his orders of the 12th,
[Footnote: _Id_., pt. iv. p. 158.] but the Confederates had the
short interior line, and Johnston had been able to concentrate about
Resaca in the course of the 13th, his rear-guard resisting Howard's
advance at Tilton, and his left under Polk holding some high hills
west of Camp Creek in front of Resaca which commanded the railroad
bridge over the Oostanaula. With the latter exception his chosen
line of defence was on the broken ridge between the Connasauga River
and Camp Creek, which were nearly parallel to each other for some
miles.

On the morning of the 14th the advance was renewed, guided as before
by the progress of the Army of the Tennessee on the right and
continuing the wheeling movement toward the east. My right brigade
(Manson) continued its connection with the rest of the army, but
Reilly's had a very difficult and laborious march. I ordered it to
advance a mile upon the road it had covered during the night, and
then by the right flank to position in line with the rest of the
command. After leaving the road Reilly had to break his way through
the woods, crossing sharp and deep ravines and watercourses, with no
path or landmark to guide him. It was especially difficult for the
artillery, and that they got through at all proved that the officers
and men were experts in woodcraft. The regiment at Martin's store
remained there as an outpost during the day.

Reilly came into line about ten o'clock, and we rested an hour till
our flankers reported Howard's corps within supporting distance
coming from Tilton. We were on the west bank of the main stream of
Camp Creek, where its upper course makes an angle with the lower,
some small branches coming into it from the northeast. The valley
itself was open, and the change in its direction allowed it to be
enfiladed by the enemy's batteries at the angle. Generals Thomas and
Schofield were together upon a hill having a commanding view, and at
the word from them, "The line will advance," we moved forward into
the valley from the slope before them. Each brigade was in two
lines, and the artillery was left on the hither side of the valley
to cover the movement and reply to the enemy's cannonade. The
skirmish line had been advanced to the edge of the woods on the far
side, and kept the lead until we approached the Confederate
trenches. We passed over two or three ridges and ravines, driving
back the skirmishers of the enemy, and charged the line of
earthworks on the crest of a higher ridge. Our men dropped fast as
we went forward, but the line was carried and the Confederates broke
from the next ridge in rear, some two hundred yards away. The
direction of these ridges was such that our left was constantly
thrown forward as we passed from one to another.

Judah's division on our right had not succeeded in crossing Camp
Creek, and our flank was exposed to a galling artillery fire, as the
ridge on which we were had its shoulder bare when it came out into
the valley, whose curve gave the enemy an enfilading fire upon us.
His infantry sought also to drive us out of the position we had
captured, and the fighting was heavy for an hour or two. But
Howard's corps came up on our left, and we made firm our hold on the
hills we had gained, forcing the Confederates to adopt a new line
curving to the eastward.

The division had lost 562 men, and our ammunition was nearly
exhausted. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. pp.
676-679.] Wagons could not follow us, and toward evening Generals
Thomas and Schofield arranged to relieve us with Newton's division
of Howard's corps, let us replenish the cartridge boxes, and then
pass to the left. This brought again the Army of the Cumberland
together, and gave us our usual position on the flank. Newton's men
came over part of the ground we had traversed, and as they crossed
the open we saw them under the enemy's cannonade, the balls here and
there bowling them over like tenpins. Harker's brigade came up to
relieve Manson's, which was the most exposed, and Manson and I were
standing together arranging the details, our horses being under
cover in the edge of the wood. Harker rode up to confer with us and
learn the situation, and as we talked, a shell exploded among us,
the concussion stunning Manson and a fragment slightly wounding
Harker. Manson's experience was a curious illustration of the effect
of such an accident. He was unaware of his hurt, and only thought,
in the moment of failing consciousness as he fell, that the motion
was that of his companions flying upward instead of his own falling;
and on coming to himself in the hospital began to speak his sorrow
for what he supposed was the death of his friends. He himself never
fully recovered from the effects of the concussion. Colonel
Opdycke's regiment was one of the first in the winning column, and
his men were hardly placed in the line before he was led back,
wounded; but as soon as his wound was dressed and he had recovered a
little from the shock, he was back at his post. The place was so hot
a one that Harker's brigade also exhausted its ammunition and had to
be relieved before the left of my own line was moved.

The captured position was firmly held by Howard's corps, whilst
Hooker's, which had been relieved by the Army of the Tennessee, was
marched to the left of Howard's, extending the line across the ridge
toward the Connasauga and turning the enemy's flank. The whole
Twenty-third Corps was also united during the night and moved to
Hooker's support, where next day Hood made strong efforts to drive
our line back. My own and Judah's division were held in reserve, but
Hovey's was put in on Hooker's left, extending the line practically
to the river, and the division took a gallant part in repulsing
Hood. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxxviii. pt. ii. p. 511.]

On the extreme right McPherson had bridged the Oostanaula at Lay's
Ferry and made demonstrations on Calhoun. The whole Army of the
Tennessee had pressed forward to Camp Creek, and toward evening of
the 14th forced a crossing and carried some hills near its mouth
which commanded the railway bridge. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xxxviii. pt. iii. pp. 92, 377.] Polk's Confederate corps made
strong efforts to dislodge McPherson's men, but failed, and the
latter intrenched the position. As Johnston had not succeeded in
dislodging Sherman at either flank of the position, and the course
of the Oostanaula made it possible for Sherman to put himself upon
the railway near Calhoun, the Confederate general evacuated the
Resaca position in the night of the 15th, retreating southward
toward Kingston and Cassville.